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Abstract
We study the e¤ects of Central Bank transparency on in‡ation and
the output gap. We thus …rst identify a small analytical model which
concludes that transparency a¤ects the variability of in‡ation and output
and not their average levels. Then we examine whether this conjecture
holds empirically, employing the recently derived index of transparency by
Eij¢nger and Geraats. The empirical …ndings con…rm that the averages
are not a¤ected by transparency. It does seem to explain however, about
50% of the variability in in‡ation. The relation between transparency
and output volatility is less clear but appears to be positive rather than
negative.
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11 Introduction
Most economists agree that greater transparency in monetary policy is desirable
because it allows the private sector to make better - that is, welfare improving
- decisions, as well as better informed decisions (Blinder, 1998). But not all
agree.
Some argue that incomplete transparency is optimal, as the e¤ect on the Cen-
tral Bank’s reputation and its consequent ability to control in‡ation has to be
balanced against the private sector’s wish to see output, employment and prices
stabilised (see for example Faust and Svensson, 2001 or Jensen, 2000). Others
argue that certain restrictions on transparency are important for operational
reasons. Once again the idea is to reinforce the Bank’s credibility (see Eij¢nger
and Hoeberichts, 2002) and to separate ‘the need to know’ from ‘the need to
understand’ (Issing, 1999).
In practice, many Central Banks have actually increased their transparency in
recent years - using in‡ation forecasts, extensive explanations of the reasoning
behind their decisions, and sometimes voting records on policy decisions or a
discussion of the ‘bias’ in those decisions, to do so. Prominent examples are
found in the Federal Reserve System in the US; but also in the Bank of England
and the Central Banks of Canada, New Zealand and Sweden. Yet, on the basis
of casual empiricism or circumstantial evidence, one cannot tell whether greater
transparency has actually made any material di¤erence to the policies chosen
- or more exactly, to the impact and e¤ectiveness of those policies. Nor is it
possible to determine exactly what kinds of e¤ects one should expect, in terms of
average in‡ation, output performance and the stability of these indicators. Our
purpose in this paper is therefore, to determine what e¤ects a lack of Central
Bank transparency should be expected to have on monetary policies and what
impact that would have on the economy.
The main problem is that transparency has many di¤erent dimensions, and
may mean di¤erent things to di¤erent people (Eij¢nger and Geraats, 2002).
Kuttner and Posen(2000) list a number of characteristics thought necessary for
institutional transparency:
² a numerical goal for monetary policy,
² an in‡ation report, explaining the expected e¤ects of changes in monetary
policy
² an in‡ation forecast (plus assumptions) explaining why those changes were
necessary and,
² a post-mortem evaluation of past policies and their achievements.
These attributes cover both the information content as well as the way in which
that information has been used. That distinction is important, but is seldom
made1. This distinction itself relates directly to the potential for con‡ict be-
tween the ability to control and the need for transparency. As a result, many
1See the discussions in Friedman (1997) or Bom…n and Reinhart (2000).
2commentators reach opposite conclusions about the need for transparency. Kut-
tner and Posen (1999) argue that it enhances the Central Bank’s ability to use
discretionary policies, while Faust and Svensson (2002) argue the opposite (al-
though for particular circumstances). In fact, both sets of authors agree that
transparency will reduce the noise and the imprecision in the private sector’s
decision making. They only di¤er as to whether greater transparency would
increase the ability of the Central Bank and private sector to make consistent
decisions, or whether it would reduce the Central Bank’s ability to control the
private sector’s natural tendency to avoid monetary discipline.
Since our purpose is to show what e¤ects a lack of transparency may have on the
economy, we have to allow for di¤erent degrees and di¤erent forms of imperfect
transparency. A lack of transparency could be said to arise when the Central
Bank has private information about the nature of shocks and the way in which
policy a¤ects the economy (Cukierman, 1992, 2000); or when the Central Bank
has not stated its objectives clearly (Cukierman and Meltzer 1986); or when
the public is uncertain about the preferences of the Central Bank (Nolan and
Schaling, 1998, Muscatelli, 1998). To allow for each of these possibilities, we
present imperfect transparency in two forms: imperfect political transparency
about priorities and objectives, and imperfect economic transparency about the
conditioning information, shocks, target values, etc. In either case, a lack of
transparency introduces a disturbance which distorts the private sector’ expec-
tations for in‡ation. That provides an automatic link both to the incentive for
the Central Bank to use its private information strategically, and to the private
sector’s desire to ensure accountability.
In this paper we examine these e¤ects using a theoretical model of monetary
policy, stripped down to its key components, and …nd that a lack of transparency
does not alter the average in‡ation or output performance of an economy. But
it does a¤ect the stability of the economy, increasing both in‡ation variability
and output volatility. Interestingly, both a lack of political transparency and
a lack of economic stability a¤ect the economy in the same way, so there is
no possibility of distinguishing between them by their impact. Then, using a
recently constructed index of Central Bank transparency due to Eij¢nger and
Geraats (2002), we test whether imperfect transparency has had the predicted
e¤ects in the main OECD countries. All our theoretical predictions are upheld,
but that for output stability which appears to increase with transparency instead
of decrease.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 de…nes political and economic
transparency and identi…es the way they a¤ect the moments of in‡ation and the
output gap. Section 3 then employs the index of transparency by Eij¢nger and
Geraats (2002) to examine its empirical relevance. We look at two alternative
groupings of this index and discuss the sensitivity of our results. Section 4
concludes.
32 The e¤ects of Greater Transparency
We adopt a Rogo¤ type model of a conservative central banker in which the
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constrained by a simple Lucas supply function:
y = ¼ ¡ ¼e + " (2)
where y and ¼ are measured as deviations from their steady state paths. The
model produces the following solutions for the policy variables in question:









We assume that there is only one player in the game (i.e. a single monetary
authority and no …scal policy2) and that there is no uncertainty in the trans-
mission of policy e¤ects. The way k is de…ned in the literature is to note that
some factors in the economy such as income taxation or unemployment insur-
ance distort the labour-leisure decision and cause the market-determined level
of employment (and output) to lie below their social optimum (Rogo¤ 1985).
A parameter k > 0 re‡ects the policy maker’s desire to correct this distortion.
There have however, been many objections as to whether having a central bank
that sets out to impose an in‡ationary bias (i.e. k 6= 0) is a sensible speci…cation
to start with (Blinder 1997). We do not attempt to resolve that dispute here.
Instead we simply note that k may be positive or zero. That is to say, we in-
clude k here because doubts about its exact value may constitute one important
source of transparency problems in monetary policy.
In this paper we consider transparency problems which arise from two possible
sources:
² misunderstandings about the true value of the preference parameters b, or
² misperceptions about the value of k that the Central Bank can be expected
to implement3.
2But see extensions to this model in which …scal policy and hence a second player (the
…scal authority or the government) is incorporated, in Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2001) or
Geraats (2002).
3Uncertainty in parameter k also covers the case of uncertainty in the in‡ation target.
4We will identify the former with political transparency and the latter with an
economic form of transparency, in line with Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2001)4.
We then examine how varying the degree of transparency, in either form, a¤ects
the ability to achieve lower in‡ation and more stable output.
2.1 Imperfect Political Transparency: the public is uncer-
tain about the true value of b
To de…ne full transparency, we start from a general speci…cation in which the
Central Bank attaches explicit weights to both its objectives. It is important to
de…ne transparency in its most general form and only then impose normalisa-
tion restrictions, in order to account for all relevant information. We therefore
consider a Central Bank which assigns positive numbers, a and b, as weights or
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But in identifying a loss function what we are actually interested in is not the
value of each of the parameters a and b per se, but the relative weight attached
to the two objectives b




¢y. The issue of transparency arises when the public’s perception about the
bank’s preferences, for example on output (¯), di¤ers from the values that the
bank itself actually considers (b). We de…ne this discrepancy as ¯ = b+´ where
´ is a random error with E(´) = 0 and V (´) = ¾2
´. This implies that the public is
correct on average, but may be mistaken when making guesses about the central
bank preferences in individual cases or at certain points in time. But uncertainty
about b implies that the relative importance that the Central Bank attaches to
controlling in‡ation is also uncertain in the public’s perception. To show this,
we rescale the sum of two parameters to equal a constant, say a+b = 1. This is
a simplifying assumption (see Geraats 2002) which helps de…ne uncertainty in
a in terms of ´ as well, i.e. ® = a ¡ ´. Similarly to above, E(®) = a. However,
this is not su¢cient in itself to de…ne transparency. Full transparency would
also require the ratio of the two parameters as perceived by the public, to equal
the ratio of the true values, on average. This is not automatically implied by
the assumptions made so far, since the expectation of a ratio is not the ratio of













a. We can re-
write (3) as:
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We can now see that the assumption E(´) = 0 is not su¢cient for full trans-
parency. For the Central Bank to be capable of delivering full transparency, at






and hence that E(¯=®) 6= b=a. The Central Bank cannot therefore, deliver
full transparency unless it provides the private sector with full information (i.e.
¾2
´ = 0) at the same time. Consequently, we de…ne full political transparency
as follows:
De…nition 1: Full political transparency occurs if conditions E(´) = 0 and
¾2
´ = 0, both hold.
Note that the objective function we will be using assumes a = 15. This is a
convenient simpli…cation and does not change any of the qualitative results we
present since the conditions for transparency remain the same. Following this
de…nition, public perceptions and Central Bank preferences are related through
¯ = b+´ where ´ has the properties de…ned above. This implies that the public
will on average anticipate the correct preference parameter, i.e. E(¯) = b.
But for full tranparency to hold, we need ¾2
´ = 0 as well. The private sector
therefore, expects the CB to implement:





Given this de…nition and the public’s perception, we now have:
Proposition 1 If the CB can correctly anticipate what the public thinks, then
an increase in political transparency reduces the variability of in‡ation and out-
put but it does not a¤ect their average levels.
5And by implication also ® = 1. This is in fact the normalisation adopted in most studies
of the transparency problem: see Cukierman (2000), Sibert (2002) or Muscatelli (1998).
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Note that E(¼¤) = bk = E(¼e) because E(¯) = b, so that the public’s expec-
tations are right on average. In that sense, this is still a rational expectations
(RE) solution. Moreover, the variance of in‡ation is:











assuming that E(´;") = 0. The variance of in‡ation is therefore, a function of
the lack of transparency perceived by the public. Indeed as ¾2
´ increases (and









k2 > 0 (7)
unless b = 0 or k = 06. But the average level of in‡ation is not a function of





even if b 6= 0 or k 6= 0. We can likewise examine what happens to output. In












if E(´;") = 0. Again this implies that the average level of equilibrium output
remains una¤ected by changes in the degree of transparency but the variance







2 > 0 (11)
6The intution behind this result is that if b = 0 or k = 0, there is essentially one target and
one instrument and as in Tinbergen’s theory of economic policy, that target can be reached
exactly on average. Consequently there is no issue of transparency to be analysed in this case
- in contrast to the cases represented by (5) and (6).








if the CB is conservative (i.e. if b < 17). Hence a lack of transparency is more
damaging to output stability than it is to in‡ation variability - and vice versa
if b > 1 - the average values of both being una¤ected. We will see below that
a lack of economic transparency will deliver exactly the same result, and in the
same ratio.
2.2 Imperfect Economic Transparency: The Public is Un-
certain about parameter k
We consider next a di¤erent form of transparency, this time relating to the public
being uncertain about the value of k that the CB targets8 (the control errors
approach by Cukierman, 2000, Geraats, 2002, Jensen, 2000, Faust-Svensson,
2001). We identify this with imperfect economic transparency. Suppose the CB
targets k but the public anticipates c = k+v, where v is an error with E(v) = 0
and V (v) = ¾2
v. As a consequence, E(c) = k. Then
De…nition 2: Full economic transparency occurs when conditions E(v) = 0
and ¾2
v = 0 both hold.
The public will therefore, expect the CB to implement:





This time transparency is indexed by the variability of v and full economic
transparency is identi…ed with ¾2
v = 0. Notice that k now contains all the
conditioning information needed from outside the problem: on exogenous and
random variables, on decisions made by other players and the target values
imposed by the policy makers themselves.
Proposition 2 If there is uncertainty about the value of output the CB targets,
then an increase in economic transparency reduces the variability of in‡ation
and output. The levels of in‡ation and output remain, on average, una¤ected.
Proof : As the CB knows what the public’s perceptions are, it will try to optimise
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7Conservative with respect to in‡ation so that b < a = 1.
8In this section b is known to the public without uncertainty.








Since E(c) = k, this implies that E(¼¤) = bk. Hence the private sector is again
correct on average and the solution is a Rational Expectations equilibrium since
E(¼¤) = E(¼e) = bk. We can therefore write the variance of in‡ation as:




















b2 > 0 (12)
The results for output can be derived in a similar way. The public forms expec-




It is easy to see that E(y¤) = 0 and therefore,
@E(y¤)
@¾2
v = 0. In addition the







assuming " and v to be uncorrelated. Hence the variance of output once again













v if the CB is conservative (b < 1). So, just as with a
lack of political transparency, a lack of economic transparency is more damaging
to output stability than to in‡ation variability in a conservative regime. At this
point there is no analytic distinction between the impacts of the two di¤erent
types of incomplete transparency.
2.3 Summary
² A lack of transparency, whether of the political or economic type, implies
no bias in average in‡ation or average output levels. Private sector expec-
tations will be correct and the average in‡ation/output outcomes will be
the same as they would be under full transparency with the same para-
meter values. In that respect, it is not a problem that the policy makers
or private sector need be concerned about.
9² In the short term however, a private sector that believed the Central Bank
to be more conservative than it actually is (¯ < b and/or c < k), might
temporarily experience lower in‡ation and higher output than otherwise.
Conversely, in‡ation would be temporarily higher and output lower if it
believed the CB to be more liberal.
² A lack of transparency does a¤ect the variability of the outcomes how-
ever. An increasing lack of transparency makes both in‡ation and output
more variable but it a¤ects output variability more than it does in‡ation.
Conversely, greater transparency produces more stable output and in‡a-
tion outcomes, but greater gains in output stability. These results hold
equally for both political and economic stability under a conservative Cen-
tral Banker (b < 1). But the relative sensitivity of output volatility would
be reversed under a more liberal Central Bank.
² Since the average outcomes are una¤ected, and the ratio of V (y¤) to V (¼¤)
is the same under a lack of political and economic transparency, there are
no testable di¤erences in the outcomes from this model. That means
that these two cases can only be distinguished in the data with prior
information: e.g. from survey information - such as in the index we use
in section 3 below - or if it is known that ¾2
´ is small relative to ¾2
v. But
if either the zero bias or the increasing stability results in (5), (7), (8) or
(9) are violated - then neither form of transparency holds and we must
look for other explanations of the impact of asymmetric information on
monetary policy making; and for any ine¤ectiveness in those policies which
may result.
3 An Index of Transparency
3.1 The Index and its components
To test the signi…cance of our results in practice, we use an index of trans-
parency recently constructed by Eij¢nger and Geraats, 2002 (henceforth E&G).
The index is compiled for nine major central banks and is based on information
disclosed by the banks themselves. Furthermore, it distinguishes between vari-
ous aspects of transparency, based on the ways in which they a¤ect monetary
policy. The E&G index is de…ned by the following components of transparency:
10Table 1: Transparency Components, E&G Index
1. Political 2. Economic
(a) Formal Objectives (a) Economic Data
(b) Quantitative Targets (b) Policy Models
(c) Institutional Arrangements (c) Central Bank Forecasts
3. Procedural 4. Policy
(a) Explicit Strategy (a) Prompt announcement
(b) Minutes (b) Policy Explanation




(c) Evaluation Policy Outcomes
Table 2 below presents the scores obtained for the individual banks, in decreasing
order of total transparency:
Table 2 : The E&G Index of Central Bank Transparency (and its components)
Political Economic Procedural Policy Operational Total
New Zealand 3 2.5 3 3 2 13.5
UK 3 2.5 3 1.5 2.5 12.5
Sweden 3 2 2 2 3 12
Canada 3 2.5 1 2 2 10.5
ECB 3 2.5 1 1.5 2 10
US 1 2.5 2 3 1.5 10
Australia 3 1 1 1.5 1.5 8
Japan 1.5 1.5 2 1.5 1.5 8
Switzerland 2.5 1.5 1 2 0.5 7.5
The last column is the arithmetic sum of the individual columns and re‡ects a
measure of total transparency. Interestingly, the ordering of banks would change
if one were to look at the speci…c components separately. For example, New
Zealand’s political, procedural and policy transparency is not matched by an
equivalent degree of clarity about her actual monetary policy operations. Simi-
larly, Australia’s political transparency does not translate into an equal degree
of economic and procedural transparency. At the other end of the scale, the US
transparency on economic and policy matters is not matched by transparency
over political priorities. Although these variations may be fairly small overall,
they are bound to a¤ect the results in some way. We attempt to account for
that in what follows by showing that essentially the same results hold under
alternative aggregations of the transparency attributes.
Two questions however, remain. First, what is the empirical relevance of such an
index, in terms of whether the degree of transparency a¤ects the main indicators
11of macroeconomic performance? Second, what is the relative importance of the
individual components? In order to identify its empirical relevance, we regress
the transparency index on, …rst, the average in‡ation rate and its standard
deviation over a speci…ed period for the countries in question; and second, on
the average output deviation from trend and its standard deviation for the
same sample period and same group of countries. Naturally, the choice of period
considered is consistent with the institutional set-up re‡ected in the index. Since
this varies from country to county, the sample period also di¤ers for each of the
nine countries. Appendix B includes a full description of the data used for each
country and justi…es the choice of sample used. Figures 1-4 show the cross plots
of the average and standard deviation of in‡ation and the output gap against
the index of transparency and the line of best …t given by the following model:
Yi = Á + ¸ijXj
where
i : average in‡ation, j : indices of political, economic,
SD of in‡ation, procedural, policy,
average output gap, operational and total transparency
SD of output gap
Parameter ¸ij stands for the impact of index j on variable i. The regressions are
implemented in univariate terms in order to examine the e¤ect of the index in
question on the moment of a given macro variable. The …gures included report
these regressions, their R2 and the t statistic on the signi…cance of the slope
parameter ¸ij.
3.2 Empirical Results
² Our empirical results con…rm that there is no statistically signi…cant cor-
relation between the index of Central Bank transparency and average
in‡ation rates, or the average output deviation from trend (and hence
output growth), for our sample of nine OECD Central Banks. This con-
…rms the …rst of the analytical predictions derived from our theoretical
model. Figures 1 and 3 show the relevant regression results, where the
index of transparency is the independent variable and the t-ratio re‡ects
the signi…cance of the slope parameter (critical value: t(8);95% = 2:3).
² Looking at the components of transparency however, the picture is slightly
di¤erent. We still fail to identify any signi…cant relationships between the
variables and the indices. But it is interesting to see that not all compo-
nents a¤ect the average level of in‡ation and output in the same direction.
Perhaps predictably, greater political, economic and policy making trans-
parency seem to go with greater in‡ation expectations in the markets.
The same holds for output gaps but with reference to political and op-
erational transparency only. It is worth investigating whether alternative
combinations of the di¤erent aspects of transparency would produce the
12same results, even if the overall e¤ects appear to be less signi…cant at the
aggregate level than at the component level.
² Having covered the results for average in‡ation and output, it is the vari-
ances of in‡ation and output that are really a¤ected by the degree of
Central Bank transparency. This can be seen in …gures 2 and 4 which
show how increasing transparency stabilises in‡ation but appears to in-
crease output variability. The former is exactly as predicted by our theo-
retical analysis; and this result is statistically signi…cant according to the
slope coe¢cient’s t-ratio (= 3:06). The latter however, is the opposite of
what our theoretical analysis predicted, although it does not appear to
be statistically signi…cant except in so far as operational transparency is
concerned. Hence, these empirical results could be consistent with our the-
oretical model if the output volatility relationship is genuinely insigni…cant
and biased to the wrong sign by small sample ‡uctuations; or if the lack
of transparency refers to the degree of target conservatism k, rather than
weight conservatism, b; or if the transparency index is actually picking
up some other aspect of Central Bank behaviour - for example di¤ering
degrees of independence9 or di¤ering degrees of uncertainty about how
the Central Banks actually formalise and pursue their own targets. Obvi-
ously to analyse that question lies beyond the scope of this paper - if only
because it may relate to a di¤erent type of transparency problem.
² In terms of the sub-components, it is the economic and the operational
transparency that matter most for the variability of in‡ation. The former
refers to anticipated changes in the economy which are accounted for by
changes in the instrument. The latter refers to the unpredictable part of
the economy not accounted for by current policy changes. Their signif-
icance demonstrates that the private sector appreciates some discussion
over these two because they provide the platform for policy evaluation.
Interestingly, as far as output variability is concerned, operational trans-
parency is the only component that seems to have a signi…cant impact
(at the 90% signi…cance level) but then in the wrong direction, in that it
increases the deviations from trend. The private sector therefore, seems
to understand that greater clarity in the intentions of the Central Bank
will entail some costs in terms of output gaps.
3.3 Alternative Weighing Schemes
In this section, we use the E&G index again but regroup its components in
order to produce an index for economic and political transparency which corre-
sponds to the theoretical model described above. We re-group the components
described in Table 1 as follows: Political Transparency is now de…ned as the sum
of 1a, 1c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 4a, 4b and 4c and Economic Transparency is now de…ned
9Some preliminary results on the links between transparency and independence can be
found in Geraats 2002b.
13as the sum of 2a, 2b, 2c, 5a, 5b, 5c and 1b. Category 1b, which captures the ex-
istence of a quantitative target, is in our view better placed under the economic
de…nition of transparency. In practice it actually makes very little di¤erence
which way the scores under 1b are actually allocated. Table 3 below shows how
the di¤erent Central Banks score under the new transparency groupings.
Table 3: Alternative Index of Transparency
Political Economic Total
New Zealand 8 5:5 13:5
UK 6:5 6 12:5
Sweden 6 6 12
Canada 5 5:5 10:5
ECB 4:5 5:5 10
US 6 4 10
Australia 4:5 3:5 8
Japan 5 3 8
Switzerland 4:5 3 7:5
We now repeat the same regression exercise in order to establish the empirical
properties of our new indices of economic and political transparency. The results
can be summarised as follows (…gures 5-6):
² The average in‡ation and in‡ation variability results match our previ-
ous …ndings, for the new indices of political and economic transparency.
The mild trends in the average in‡ation results are clearly insigni…cant
and anyway mutually o¤setting. They are likely to be the result of small
sample problems therefore. But the in‡ation stability results are signi…-
cant and of the right sign in both cases. These results are exactly as our
theoretical model predicts, (…gure 5).
² The average output and output stability results are again as before. There
is essentially no trend in the average output results at all, as anticipated.
This result holds as before, for both types of transparency. However,
the output variability results continue to show the wrong sign and more
strongly now for economic transparency than for political transparency.
However both relationships remain statistically insigni…cant, (…gure 6).
3.4 Sensitivity
We provide a detailed sensitivity analysis of the results derived in Appendix B
and only summarise here the shortcomings of the analysis undertaken.
² Clearly, the limitations of the data cannot be emphasised often enough.
The results of this exercise can therefore only be seen as correlations be-
tween variables rather than robust causal relations. There are only 9 data
points which implies that the removal or addition of one observation can
(and does) alter the results (See Appendix B for examples of this). We
14have therefore been very reluctant to remove outliers (e.g. Japan and/or
Switzerland) in order to try and capture as much information as possible
out of such a set. As explained in the appendix, (and shown in …gures
7 and 8) the signi…cant results attained remain robust to changes in the
countries included, pointing in the direction of a substantive relationship.
But elsewhere, we are not able to tell whether insigni…cant results are due
to the lack of data or to a lack of correlation.
² As explained above, the mean and variance for in‡ation and output devi-
ations from trend are regressed against the indices of transparency. The
period chosen to calculate the means and standard deviations is crucial
empirically but naturally, also theoretically. It is thus important to con-
sider the average and variance of that period which is consistent with the
institutional set-up captured by the E&G index. The choice of period is
based on a number of papers written by the Central Banks themselves, in
which they explain their latest institutional changes and their precise tim-
ing (see Appendix B). At the same time it is important to try to keep the
period as long as possible in order to include as much information in the
data set as possible. We have experimented with the choice of period for
the Bank of England and the ECB. The relevant timing for the UK is from
the beginning of 1998 onwards. We …nd that if the moments of the UK
in‡ation and output gap series considered refer to the whole of the 1990s
instead, the overall relationship between the variables and transparency
weakens, (see …gure 9). In that sense, the increase in transparency at the
Bank of England has clearly had desirable e¤ects. The same experiment
for the Euro area does not make an appreciable di¤erence in the results
and is therefore not reported.
² The results referring to deviations of output from trend, depend on the
detrending method used to derive potential output. The results discussed
so far rely entirely on the statistical …lters by Hodrick and Prescott, 1980
(HP). There are a number of alternative …ltering procedures however, and
we experiment with the one based on the Christiano and Fitzgerald, 1999
contribution (CF). The choice of …lter does make some di¤erence - in
particularly with respect to the average deviations from trend and (less
so) for the variance of output. We compare …gures 3, 4 and 5, to …gures
10, 11 and 12 respectively. This comparison provides further evidence
in support of our theoretical model, that transparency is related to the
variance of the output gap, rather than to its average level. (see Appendix
B for a detailed discussion).
3.5 Transparency and Independence
The disappointing result in this analysis is that we have failed to …nd a negative
relationship between the E&G index of transparency and output variability.
All the other theoretical predictions have been borne out by these data on
transparency. One explanation of this failure, but not the only one, is that
15this index of transparency con‡ates independence with transparency in a world
where one might expect independence and output volatility to be positively
related. The reasons for suspecting a positive relation between transparency
and independence are:
1. Political and economic independence have been recognised, over the past
15 years, as the crucial properties for good central bank performance. But
as independence has increased in the OECD and European economies,
so has the need for political legitimacy and public accountability led to
demands for greater transparency. These two properties therefore tend to
go hand-in-hand: both transparency and independence tend to enhance
credibility (Eij¢nger and Hoeberichts, 2002). Conversely, Geraats (2000b)
argues that those central banks most subject to (or most concerned with)
political pressures are the ones now most reluctant to be transparent about
their operations.
2. An examination of the de…nitions of what is said to constitute an index
of independence10 shows that, in practice, there is a certain overlap with
what is generally regarded as transparency. Aspect 1c in the E&G index
of transparency is a case in point. Here a central bank with explicit
instrument independence is rewarded equally for transparency. Moreover
Geraats (2000b) reports a correlation coe¢cient of 0.43 between the two,
using one of the standard measures of independence.
3. Much of the recent literature has argued that a conservative (in‡ation
averse) central banker will have to put up with higher output variability
if he/she is to retain lower in‡ation on average (Rogo¤, 1985; Vredin and
Warne 2000). Given a signi…cant positive correlation between the mea-
sures of independence and transparency, that would explain our perverse
result exactly. It is simply an artifact of the way this particular index
of transparency has been constructed, and is not necessarily a feature of
transparency in general.
4. The counterargument would be that the empirical literature has found
little, if any, association between the degree of central bank independence
and output volatility (Alesina and Summers, 1993). But that does not
go so far as to imply a negative relationship such as we are looking for.
Nor does it explain why de‡ation costs worsen as independence increases
(Eij¢nger and De Haan 1996; Ball 1999).
In short we are still left with output volatility rising when the measures of in-
dependence and transparency overlap11. Thus the upshot of our results is that
10See Eij¢nger and De Haan, 1996 for a survey.
11In fact the Alesina and Summers “low in‡ation at no cost” result may only hold when …scal
policies are active in output stabilisation. Both Melitz (1997) and Wyploz (1999) have shown
that …scal policies tend to move in opposite directions in the OECD economies - even in those
with the most independent central banks. The implication is that …scal policies have likely
been used to contain output volatility,obscuring the e¤ects of transparency or independence
on in‡ation or output volatility.
16greater precision is really needed, …rst to determine what exactly this E&G in-
dex of transparency measures; and second to design measures of transparency
and independence that distinguish properly between the two. Greater mod-
elling precision may also be needed to control for the impact of …scal policy
in reducing output variability; and for reducing the e¤ective independence of
monetary policy or the clarity of (the private sectors view of) the central banks
operations.
4 Conclusions
A simple model of transparency in Central Bank policy making shows that
increases in the degree of transparency would not a¤ect the average levels of
in‡ation and output achieved. But it would decrease the degree of volatility in
both in‡ation and output gap levels - and the more so, in output volatility if
the Central Bank is (weight) conservative.
When we test these predictions against the only numerical index of transparency
available for nine OECD countries in the 1990s, we …nd that all the predictions
are veri…ed but for the reduction of output volatility. The latter appears to rise
with increasing transparency. And although the size of the sample quite clearly
limits our ability to draw conclusions, this result remains robust across the dif-
ferent sensitivity checks performed. It is likely therefore, that the transparency
index captures some other elements of Central Bank behaviour - for example,
di¤ering degrees of independence or uncertainty about the policy goals that the
Central Bank ought to pursue. These two are observationally equivalent in our
model. This conclusion therefore, underlines our initial hypotheses: it is im-
portant to distinguish clearly between that lack of transparency which refers to
the possession of precise information which the CB chooses, strategically, not to
reveal to the private sector; and that lack of transparency that arises through
uncertainty, meaning that the Central Bank does not have precise information
itself - although it is perfectly prepared to release what information it does
have. These two cases may have quite di¤erent consequences, and these empir-
ical results suggest that what passes for a lack of transparency in conventional
discussions may be as much the latter as the former.
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20APPENDICES
A Imperfect Political Transparency: An Uncer-
tain value for parameter b





















Note that E(¼¤) = ^ bk = E(¼e). We calculate the variance of in‡ation as follows:
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21A.1 Imperfect Economic Transparency: An Uncertain value
for parameter k
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Solving this for ¼¤ produces:
@L
@¼








And hence E(¼¤) = bk. The variance is calculated as follows V (¼¤) = E [¼¤ ¡ E(¼¤)]
2.
First, we calculate deviations from mean:
¼¤ ¡ E(¼¤) =
b
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Similarly for output. The public forms expectations for in‡ation as ¼e = bc. In



















assuming " and v are uncorrelated.
22B Data
We examine the countries included in the E&G index, namely, New Zealand,
UK, Sweden, Canada, the Euro area, US, Australia, Japan and Switzerland.
We use the following quarterly series: CPI in‡ation (year on year), real GDP
(volumes de‡ated by GDP de‡ators) deviations from trend (calculated by the
Hodrick-Prescott and the Cristiano-Fitzgerald …lters). The data range from the
early 90s till the end of 2001 for most countries and are taken from Datastream
and the ECB. As explained in the main text, the index of transparency re‡ects
an institutional set up that varies from country to country. To allow for this
therefore, the macroeconomic variables are only considered for the relevant years
for each of the countries, based on information available to us. The adjustments
made therefore, are as follows:
² Sweden: we consider data from 1993 onwards since this is the …rst phase
associated with the Riksbank gaining credibility (Berg et al 2002).
² Australia: we consider data from 1996, the time the in‡ation target was
formally enshrined in the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy.
(Aylmer, 2002)
² Switzerland: there has been a new monetary policy concept since the
beginning of 2000 in Switzerland but this is too recent to allow for any
variance in in‡ation (Jordan and Peytrignet, 2002). We consider data for
the whole period therefore.
² UK: we consider the time period from 1998, since the Bank of England
was given operational independence only in May 1997 (see Allsopp,2002).
² Despite the late creation of EMU (1999) we consider data from the start
of the 90s on the basis that convergence was necessary before the actual
creation of a centralised monetary authority in Europe. We have experi-
mented however, with shorter periods starting towards the end of the 90s
but the results derived were very similar.
For the remainder of the countries we consider the period from the start of the
90s.
B.1 Sensitivity Analysis
The …gures included in the main text calculate the mean and standard devia-
tions of the two variables over the implied periods and then correlate them to
the aggregate and component indices of transparency constructed by Eij¢nger
and Geraats (2002), or with our regrouped indices for political and economic
transparency. In what follows we present some comments on the sensitivity of
the results. We conduct a number of sensitivity tests.
23² Comments on outliers. Figures 7 and 8 drop Japan and Switzerland
respectively and examine what happens to the relevance of the E&G index
as a result. These …gures are comparable to the …rst plots of overall
transparency, i.e. …gures 1(a)-4(a). The results remain very similar to
what is attained with the two countries included; the variance of in‡ation
is the main variable that is a¤ected by transparency and the variance of
output appears to deteriorate as transparency increases. The signi…cance
of these results is slightly weakened by dropping these two countries.
² Changing the Sample Size. An extra source of sensitivity naturally
arises from the sample period chosen, for which to calculate the average
and standard deviations. In the case of the UK this turns out to be
particularly important. We present therefore, the impact implied on the
whole index when the average and standard deviation of in‡ation and
output considered for the UK are calculated for the whole of the 90s and
not starting from 1998. (Figure 9). We compare those again to …gures
1(a)-4(a). The results are now di¤erent to what we got before, in that
any signi…cance in the results is lost and the relationship between average
in‡ation and transparency is positive (although insigni…cant). As already
mentioned, this did not make much of a di¤erence in the case of the Euro
area. Nevertheless, this points to the fact that identifying the correct
sample (in the sense that it matches the institutional set-up described by
the index) may be empirically important.
² Deriving the Output Deviation from Trend. Finally we apply two
standard methodologies to derive potential output, namely the Hodrick-
Prescott, 1980 (HP) and the Christiano Fitzgerald 1999 (CF) …lters. The
results obtained using the former are given in the main text. Figures 10-
12 present the results obtained when using the CF …lter and are directly
comparable to …gures 3, 4 and 6 respectively. We apply these two …lters
because they make use of two alternative methodologies for extracting
trends. The former relies thus on a smoothing parameter which encapsu-
lates the trade-o¤ between having to reduce the variability of the derived
series on the one hand and wanting to stick as close to the original data
as possible, on the other. The CF …lter is part of a more recently devel-
oped literature and falls in the category of band-pass …lters. These types
of …lters focus on a predetermined frequency range which has a clearer
interpretation. However, it is a relatively new …lter which has not been
widely tested empirically. We will therefore only use it as a yardstick for
comparison. The comparisons are quite similar to ones previous made.
The variance of the output gap is positively correlated with transparency
and with very similar levels of signi…cance. The level of the output gap
however, is now related negatively to transparency and is more stronger
than before. It remains insigni…cant however at the con…dence levels con-
sidered.
² A case for omitted variables. Given the limitations of the data set,
24the regressions performed can only be seen as an attempt to identify cor-
relations rather than strong causal relationships between the variables
examined. We acknowledge the fact that regressions of this sort will su¤er
from omitted-variables e¤ects, re‡ecting the possible in‡uences of macro-
economic variables (like …scal policy stance, openness to trade) or possible
correlations between the variability of in‡ation and output. We have ex-
perimented with respect to the latter, therefore including the variability of
output as a regressor in the variability of in‡ation equation, and the other
way round. The results obtained however, (available from the authors)
are very similar to the ones presented.
² Alternative groupings. Naturally, there is no clear-cut way of grouping
the sub-components of the E&G index. In the main text we have identi…ed
Political Transparency with the sum of 1a, 1c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 4a, 4b and 4c
and Economic Transparency with the sum of 1b, 2a, 2b, 2c, 5a, 5b, 5c and
1b. As an alternative grouping we have experimented with incorporating
Policy transparency (4a, 4b and 4c) as part of the Economic grouping.
The results (available by the authors) are very similar to ones already
described (albeit political transparency is less signi…cant).
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